

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES
AND ANCHOR STATES FOR DETERMINING AFRICOM'S
RECEPTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

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13 February 2014

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Biography

Lt Col Paul “Smitty” Smith is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. Lt Col Smith is a Logistics Readiness Officer in the United States Air Force. His previous assignment was to the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) as Chief of Requirements Review within the Capabilities Analysis Division. As such, Lt Col Smith was responsible for assessing and advocating for combatant command logistics requirements for war plans and shepherding them through the annual capabilities gap assessment and program and budget review processes. Lt Col Smith’s most recent deployment (2009-2010) was to Kabul, Afghanistan as Deputy CJ35 (Future Operations) for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (IJC). Prior to assignment to the Pentagon as an Air Staff and subsequently Joint Staff Action Officer in 2008, Lt Col Smith commanded the “Mighty Wraiths” 8th Logistics Readiness Squadron, Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea--with 350 other logistics professionals providing the sustainment muscle for 46 F-16 combat coded aircraft.

Abstract

In 2008, the U.S. established AFRICOM in full operating status. When African leaders expressed non-receptive views on the command's presence and mission, AFRICOM adjusted its approach. Given AFRICOM's methodology of working with and through Africans, the willingness of the region's most influential political actors to work with the command (which defines "receptivity" for the purpose of this paper) is key for success. However, it is impossible to know if AFRICOM's recalibrated posture and mission have yielded increased willingness to work with the command, since scholars have based their research upon snapshot-in-time internet searches and occasional interviews—an incomplete methodology. Future research to gauge AFRICOM's receptivity by the region's most influential audiences must incorporate Africa's pervasive tendency to organize into Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to address developmental and security challenges.

Through an assessment of evolving U.S. interests in Africa, AFRICOM's mission and posture, and aspects of Africa's colonial and neocolonial history, this paper arrives at a realism-informed determination of the audiences future researchers should focus on for actionable results (realism is a school of political theory that advocates for state behavior as driven by the anarchic condition of the international system). These audiences are Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs), as well as the predominant state within each REC (or "anchor" state). This methodology identifies three criteria for future research, centering on AFRICOM's approach, the continent's nature and history, and Sub-Saharan Africa's tendency to address problems through integration.

Introduction

Motivated by the increasing significance of Africa to U.S. interests, President George Bush announced his intention to establish a new combatant command (CCMD), AFRICOM, in 2007. In October 2008, AFRICOM achieved full operational capability.¹ Within the DOD, CCMDs are responsible for utilizing forces under their command to achieve U.S. national security objectives.² Before AFRICOM, three CCMDs were responsible for Africa; consequently, a lack of unified action made it difficult to coordinate U.S. activities in the region. AFRICOM's initial mission statement entailed "military-to-military programs, military-sponsored activities, and other military operations as directed to promote a stable and secure African environment."³

Despite an intent to promote a stable African environment, the advent of AFRICOM elicited muted and hostile reactions from influential Africans.⁴ Some African leaders felt the new command represented the militarization of U.S. activities on the continent, as well as a bid to obtain Africa's natural resources. AFRICOM subsequently conducted a communications campaign to emphasize interagency and non-kinetic aspects of the command.⁵ AFRICOM's leaders also revamped the command's mission statement, emphasizing working with and through "states and regional organizations."⁶ AFRICOM's focus on regional institutions recognized a tendency among African leaders to address security and developmental challenges through integrating structures (with the African Union [AU] recognizing no less than eight Regional Economic Communities [REC]). As one Africa scholar asserted, the "desire to achieve greater economic integration of the continent has led to creation of the most extensive network of regional organizations anywhere in the world."⁷

Given AFRICOM’s methodology of working with and through Africans, the willingness of the region’s most influential political actors to work with the command (which defines “receptivity” for the purpose of this paper) is key for success.⁸ Therefore, receptivity by RECs, as well as the most prominent state in each REC--or “anchor” state--is critical for AFRICOM’s ability to accomplish its partnering mission. Unfortunately, most research on the willingness of Africans to work with AFRICOM has not included a comprehensive review of these influential political actors.⁹ Instead, researchers conducted anecdotal interviews and snapshot-in-time internet queries to unearth unfavorable material. This methodology does not provide a holistic picture of the willingness of Africans to work with the command.¹⁰ Given the nature and history of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as AFRICOM’s mission, what audience should be the focus of research?

Due to the continent’s history, AFRICOM’s mission and posture, as well as the strong tendency of African countries to organize into regional political structures, future research focused on the perceptions and actions of actors within RECs and anchor states will provide the most helpful assessments. Specifically, an agenda for future research (to determine willingness to work with AFRICOM) should focus on the most influential audiences. Consequently, this paper begins with a review of evolving U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, to provide a basis for adjudicating the responsiveness of REC and anchor state actors related to those interests. Secondly, AFRICOM’s organization and posture are assessed to highlight the command’s “small footprint” strategy in response to initial African resistance. Thirdly, sources of African resistance to AFRICOM, such as the continent’s colonial and neocolonial history, are reviewed, unearthing some of the motivations behind their unwillingness to work with AFRICOM, as well as a tendency to approach challenges from a regional basis. When viewed through a realism-

informed filter (realism is a political theory that advocates for state behavior as driven by the anarchic condition of the international system), this penchant for integration helps explain why RECs and their anchor states are essential “touch points” for determining each region’s overall willingness to work with AFRICOM.¹¹ Finally, three criteria (“ways” for RECs and anchor states to express their level of receptivity of AFRICOM) are described to focus future research. Because these criteria center on AFRICOM’s mission, Africa’s history, and Africa’s cooperative tendencies, they are the most fertile research areas for yielding actionable results.

Evolving U.S. Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

Before September 11, 2001: Limited U.S. Interest

The creation of AFRICOM was a strategic shift, since in the immediate post-Cold War period the US did not consider Africa enough of a priority to merit its own Combatant Command (CCMD). Before the 1990s, the U.S. was even *more* disinterested. As a U.S. defense analyst commented regarding this period, “during the Cold War, United States foreign policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa had little to do with Africa.”¹² In the beginning of the current century, it did not get much better. Nations conduct grand strategy by determining their interests and objectives, identifying resources, and then devising plans to apply resources against those objectives. The grand strategy blue print for the U.S. is the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the NSS released in December 2000 concluded the U.S. had yet to figure out its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.¹³

Post-September 11, 2001: Surge in Interests

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and subsequent “War on Terrorism” propelled a surge in U.S. interests in the region. The 2002 NSS devoted seven paragraphs solely to Africa, noting, “Africa’s capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be

strengthened...to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.”¹⁴ The 2006 NSS termed Africa a high priority for addressing threats from “fragile and failing states” and “ungoverned areas.” The most recent NSS (2010) highlighted “conflict prevention, global peacekeeping, [and] counterterrorism” as priorities.¹⁵ Economic ties also fostered growing U.S. interests. In 2007, a senior DOD official highlighted the error of overlooking Sub-Saharan Africa, since, in addition to the tens of thousands of U.S. jobs tied to it, the region also possessed 8% of the world’s petroleum and an abundance of critical minerals and metals.¹⁶ In addition, to help secure vital and vulnerable sea lines of communication and trade routes from piracy and illegal trafficking, the U.S. felt compelled to increase partner nation training and force presence in the region. As an additional indicator of expanding interests, from 2000 to 2010 the total share of U.S. foreign aid to Africa grew from nine to twenty-nine percent.¹⁷

AFRICOM’s Organization and Posture: Small Footprint and Interagency Approach

Small Footprint in Response to African Resistance

In pursuit of these expanding U.S. strategic interests and in the face of resistance from prominent African leaders, DOD refocused AFRICOM to be “low-key...geared toward building relationships with African nations.”¹⁸ With the exception of Egypt (the sole African country remaining in Central Command’s area of operations), in 2010 the military footprint on the continent averaged just 3,500 troops. Initially, DOD planned to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent, along with five regional hub offices. However, despite assurances of a discrete troop presence, few African countries and regional organizations were receptive to hosting infrastructure or working with the new command.¹⁹

Due in part to negative African reactions, in 2012 DOD announced the command's headquarters would remain in Stuttgart, Germany, with approximately 1,500 of AFRICOM's 2,000 assigned personal. In lieu of regional hubs, AFRICOM opted to coordinate some of its activities via hybrid Defense Attaché and Security Cooperation offices in 38 African countries (with a mix of DOS and DOD personnel).²⁰ The command also assigned liaison officers to the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center, the International Peace Support Training Center, the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) REC, and the African Union (AU).²¹ AFRICOM also has an operating site on Ascension Island in the south Atlantic, while multiple European bases provide logistics support.²² In addition, AFRICOM has personnel assigned to an intelligence center at Molesworth, England. In line with the command's small footprint strategy, AFRICOM maintains cooperative security location agreements with multiple African countries, enabling as needed access to strategic locations.²³

AFRICOM has one combined and joint task force, one sub-unified command, and four service component commands assigned.²⁴ Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, with approximately 2,000 (mainly rotational) personnel. CJTF-HOA is the largest AFRICOM presence on the continent. The task force initially focused on counterterrorism; however, prompted by AFRICOM's advent, CJTF-HOA now also takes a more indirect approach, to include partnering with like-minded nation militaries to develop security capabilities.²⁵ AFRICOM's sub-unified command is Special Operations Command, Africa, charged, in part, with counterterrorism and military-to-military training. Finally, as with the other CCMDs, AFRICOM has components from each military service—all based in Europe.²⁶

Interagency Structure

Beyond the command's posture, other factors supporting the small footprint approach are AFRICOM's interagency structure with a focus on working through other U.S. agencies in the region to accomplish its objectives.²⁷ To facilitate these efforts, AFRICOM has 30 personnel assigned from nine federal agencies. In addition, and unique among CCMDs, the command has a civilian deputy combatant commander. The incumbent is a U.S. Foreign Service Officer who directs humanitarian, disaster response, and other assistance activities.²⁸

AFRICOM's interagency structure and posture are unique among CCMDs. The primary motivation for the small footprint is the initial reaction by some of the continent's most prominent African leaders, since AFRICOM originally attempted to place its headquarters and other infrastructure on the continent—before backing off quickly after this demonstration of negative receptivity.²⁹ Another contributing factor is the recognition among U.S. political and military decision makers of the importance of working with and through African nations and regional organizations to accomplish AFRICOM's core mission of strengthening partner capacity in pursuit of U.S. interests.³⁰

Sources of Non-Receptivity

Given AFRICOM's small footprint posture, interagency structure, and mission emphasis on collaborating with African countries, it may be difficult to understand why some African political actors are non-receptive to the command's mission and presence. Arguably, the complexity of the command's area of operations helps create resistance to AFRICOM's presence and mission, even in the absence of additional factors. Africa has 54 nations, 11.7 million square miles, over one billion people, over 800 ethnic groups, over 1,000 languages, and a huge disparity between the well off and poverty stricken among the population. Seven of the world's

ten most failed states are in Africa, also eight of the ten most fragile and eight of the ten weakest.³¹ Given the breadth of Africa’s cultural and geopolitical landscape, it is a monumental task to keep all these stakeholders satisfied. However, an assessment of Africa’s colonial and neocolonial history, along with a review of more contemporary African perceptions, highlights some additional circumstances leading to unwillingness among many Africans to work with AFRICOM.

Colonial and More Recent (Including Neocolonial) Factors

Africa’s colonial and neocolonial past contributes to the command’s lack of acceptance on the continent. This history helped inculcate a skeptical view toward U.S. —and other non-African nation—activities among many African leaders. This view holds that for hundreds of years invaders and occupiers from the West pillaged Africa’s resources (for example, slaves, gold, ivory, and—more recently—oil). Western overseers also established arbitrary political boundaries and enforced foreign political, legal, educational, and religious systems while disrupting indigenous systems. Since colonial rule replaced indigenous political systems without fostering local forms of civil society, at inception many African countries possessed “scarcely any educated citizens, limited or no experience of democracy,” and underdeveloped manufacturing, agriculture, and infrastructure.³² In addition, during the Cold War, while the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in proxy conflicts in the region, the U.S. opposed regimes who developed relations with communist powers. Finally, to the chagrin of some African leaders, as their nations sought independence during the 1950s-1960s, the U.S. did not openly support United Nations (UN) governance and developmental initiatives within territories U.S. decision makers considered unfriendly.³³

Perceptions AFRICOM Will Enable U.S. Hegemony

Given the region’s historical experiences with the West, many Africans are jealous of their “sovereignty and are highly suspicious of foreigners, even those with good intentions.”³⁴ However, as Stephen Burgess persuasively argued, perceptions of recent U.S. behaviors have also spurred reluctance among many to welcome AFRICOM.³⁵ The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and subsequent support for Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006, also raised concerns AFRICOM would similarly militarize Africa. In addition, some observers characterized AFRICOM as an effort to compete with the increasing influence of non-western powers in pursuit of Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade, investment opportunities, and natural resources.³⁶ There is some basis for this perception. As Keir Giles argued, Sub-Saharan Africa is a prime region for great power competition due to strong economic growth rates and bountiful natural resources.³⁷

Recently two researchers concluded the command’s perception problem (of Africans labeling it an arm of economic imperialism) has motivated U.S. decision-makers to clothe AFRICOM as a benign initiative to assist with security and developmental problems.³⁸ This view of U.S. motives may be compelling to some prominent African leaders in light of the region’s increasing importance to international trade and investment. From 2001 through 2011, Sub-Saharan Africa possessed four out of the world’s ten quickest growing economies. By 2007, Africa ranked second among oil exporting regions, and some observers estimated the continent possessed a third of the earth’s mineral reserves. In addition, from 2008 through 2011 Sino-African trade increased eleven times over, with a perceived resulting increase in Chinese influence.³⁹ It is difficult to argue—and U.S. officials would probably not disagree with the contention—that Sub-Saharan Africa’s oil reserves and other natural resources influence U.S. decision making, since by 2011 they constituted 90 percent of U.S. imports from the region.⁴⁰

Finally, some political actors within Africa's anchor states and RECs feel the command threatens their regional and continental hegemonic power. For example, the leadership of the South African Development Community (SADC) REC, with South Africa as the anchor state, seemed concerned AFRICOM would upset South Africa's position as SADC's most influential country in the African Union.⁴¹

Africa's Pechant for Integration

As the previous section highlighted, a mix of factors drives the unwillingness of some Africans to accept and work with AFRICOM. These include geopolitical and social complexities, colonial era governance practices and legacies, neocolonial era superpower policies, and, more recently, U.S. military actions in the region. Some of these factors also contribute to Africa's strong tendency to address economic, security, and social challenges through regional cooperation. Regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, scholar and African tribal chief S.K.B. Asante wrote, "the case for regional and sub-regional economic integration...is indisputable."⁴² This section outlines additional forces driving this tendency to address problems cooperatively. After describing the concept of regionalism, the colonial and neocolonial roots of integration are assessed. Finally, more recent state-based economic and security motives, which a realist lens helps reveal, are described. This section reinforces the argument that Africa's pervasive undercurrent of cooperative tendencies has produced a multitude of extremely influential regional structures. Failing to account for the willingness of these structures to work with AFRICOM will not produce actionable results.

Regionalism

Regionalism is the concept of national political actors leveraging integration and cooperation to address economic, security, and social challenges. The concept is implemented

when multiple countries in close geographic proximity possess the requisite common “social, cultural, political, and historical” experiences to enable and motivate cooperation.⁴³ A mix of colonial and neocolonial forces activates this concept in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Colonial and Neocolonial History: Balkanization and the Roots of Integration

In Sub-Saharan Africa, regional integration has deep historical roots. Colonial powers established regional boundaries across swaths of Sub-Saharan African territories to ease the burden of administration.⁴⁴ For example, European rulers in East Africa administratively bundled three contiguous colonies together to largely encompass the geography of the future East African Community (EAC) REC. While colonial administrators leveraged regionalism to ease administrative burdens, African leaders began to view the concept as a way to promote a form of regional nationalism. This was necessary because many of the continent’s emerging countries inherited the colonial era legacy of boundaries separating “historical lands, tribes, and even families into forced concepts of nations.” The artificial boundaries weakened the ability of African leaders to engender nationalistic loyalty among citizens.⁴⁵ In response to the balkanization of their homelands, some African leaders attempted to facilitate popular nationalism through social and economic development via integration.⁴⁶

A Realist View of Economic and Security Motives for Integration

Due in part to their colonial origins, many emerging African nations had a “sparse population, small internal market, limited infrastructure, new and fragile borders, economies vulnerable to fluctuating world prices,” and land locked geography (with an increased transportation burden to get their goods to market). In 1989, the Gross National Product (GNP) of all Sub-Saharan African countries combined (less South Africa) approximated Belgium’s GNP, with resulting poverty and instability.⁴⁷ As late as 1998, 36 of Africa’s 54 countries had a

population of 12 million or less and per capita income of \$500 U.S. dollars annually, with extremely limited internal markets to rely upon for economic viability.⁴⁸ Continued declines among critical economic indicators in the 1980s-1990s further incentivized integration to overcome challenges.⁴⁹

Though economic challenges helped prompt African leaders to create RECs, they soon realized security through political integration is a prerequisite for economic growth.⁵⁰ Security concerns have, and continue to be, at the forefront of African leaders' minds, since Africa has suffered from high rates of destabilizing conflict.⁵¹ In addition, since these conflicts often cross multiple state borders, addressing them via cross-border integrating structures is an attractive—and necessary--methodology. One long-standing example of a cross border conflict in Africa is the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency in parts of Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Congo, which has displaced over two million people since 2008.⁵²

Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the structural school of realist international relations theory, asserted the anarchic and self-help condition of the international system as the most significant driver of state behavior. For Waltz, the international system drives weaker states to balance against more powerful rivals in pursuit of survival.⁵³ The more powerful “rivals,” in the case of African countries banding together into RECs to foster security and economic development, are neocolonial competitors from the developed world, as well as homegrown sources of internal and cross border instability. In this sense, the tendency of African states to cooperate and integrate is an articulation of countries positioning themselves defensively to increase their power and options by balancing against outside forces.⁵⁴ This condition argues for paying close attention to the critical economic and security roles of integrating political structures when considering AFRICOM’s receptivity.

In addition to the aforementioned forces favoring integration, the colonial era formation of regional political and economic structures, as well as the neocolonial legacy of balkanized, weak states, activate regionalism. This condition manifests the propensity for African countries to band into RECs in pursuit of economic and social development, as well as physical security. Because of this, RECs and associated anchor states, as key elements within Africa's security and economic architecture, should serve as essential receptivity "touch points" for researchers attempting to determine Africa's willingness to work with AFRICOM.

Receptivity "Touch Points"

Africa's Security and Peace Architecture: The Unique Role and Constituency of RECs

During the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. and USSR engaged in Cold War proxy conflicts in Africa, with superpower desires and actions greatly influencing African politics. In an attempt to resist this outside interference and to address economic, security, and social challenges in general, the leaders of 53 African countries formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963.⁵⁵ In 1976, the OAU subdivided Africa into five regions, with each region already possessing RECs in varying stages of development. African leaders originally envisioned RECs as unions to facilitate member state "social, economic, political, and cultural" development.⁵⁶ However, as previously noted, these leaders soon also began ceding security responsibilities to RECs, vastly increasing the influence and constituency of these regional organizations within member states, regional populations, and throughout the continent.⁵⁷

In 2002, OAU members formed the AU. As part of an emerging African Peace and Security Architecture, the AU protocol stipulated the inherent security responsibilities within Africa's regional economic mechanisms.⁵⁸ The protocol also projected an African Security Force (ASF) of five regional brigades (of 3,000 troops each) to provide organic security

capabilities. Due to resourcing delays and the reticence of some states to place military capabilities in the hands of non-state structures, the AU pushed the deadline for standing up all brigades from 2010 to 2015. However, security integration planning continued, and in 2008 the AU and RECs institutionalized a relationship for mobilizing and utilizing REC military forces under the coordinating guidance of the AU.⁵⁹

Critically for AFRICOM's mission and presence in Africa, AU members also acknowledged the ability of RECs to operate independently of the AU in some cases, to include when executing peacekeeping operations.⁶⁰ In fact, the unique position of RECs in Africa helps them to "play a strong role in shaping leadership views and opinions" informing AU policy making.⁶¹ The influence wielded by RECs prompted Africa specialist Diane Chido to advise AFRICOM--as part of a larger effort to boost receptivity--to ask RECs to inform their constituencies of the command's positive impact on the continent.⁶² Due to their security and economic responsibilities and capabilities, as well as their unique regional constituency, the behavior and actions of RECs are key indicators for determining the willingness of Africans to accept and work with AFRICOM.

Anchor States Through a Realist Lens

From the viewpoint of AFRICOM's mission and U.S. interests, RECs are significant actors in Africa. However, it would be an underestimation of the predominant role states play in the international system to neglect the impact of regional hegemons on REC perceptions and actions. An anchor state, or a regional hegemon, is the state within each REC possessing sufficient resources and power as to exhibit outsized influence on the rest of the REC's members--and sometimes on the continent as a whole.⁶³ Thus, due to the anchor state's

influencing position, researchers should pay as much heed to them as RECs. A realist view of state behavior, supported by a few historical examples, supports this observation.

The realist school of international relations political theory generally suggests states, among political actors, play the most important role in the international system, with a natural propensity to compete with each other for power and influence.⁶⁴ As Asante contended, RECs, as integrating structures, are not “an end in themselves”—African leaders established them for the ultimate good of their own countries.⁶⁵ Anchor states, due to their hegemonic power status, have typically taken the lead on REC planning and on determining and implementing solutions to cross border problems.⁶⁶ In 2007, when DOD sought a location in Africa for AFRICOM’s headquarters, Nigeria, a regional hegemon, successfully advocated with fellow Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) nations to keep the headquarters out of their region, and South Africa performed the same role for the South African Development Community (SADC).⁶⁷ In addition, when a faction overthrew Mali’s government in 2012, Nigeria’s relatively robust military capabilities enabled ECOWAS to respond to the crisis without relying wholly on UN or Western assistance.”⁶⁸

Another case of how an anchor state’s view is helpful for understanding REC behavior is provided by Powell, who concluded RECs are sometimes influenced by the domestic politics and national interests of their regional hegemons.⁶⁹ For example, in the summer of 2013 Nigeria began pulling its contingent of ECOWAS peacekeeping forces from Mali--potentially undermining the REC’s peacekeeping mission--to combat the Boko Haram insurgency in its own backyard.⁷⁰ Finally, the lack a regional hegemon can also help explain REC behavior. Due to the absence of a recognized anchor state, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has not been able to advance a viable agenda to address long-term instability in the

Central African Republic.⁷¹ Though RECs are important for understanding the relative acceptance of Africans to AFRICOM, realism helps prevent an incomplete determination of receptivity touch points by arguing for paying careful attention to anchor states as well.

Recommended Criteria for Determining REC and Anchor State Receptivity

Given the influence of RECs and anchor states, the nature and history of Africa (which spurs receptivity challenges while also contributing to integrative tendencies expressed as RECs with associated anchor states), and AFRICOM’s mission and approach, the following criteria seem appropriate for future research. Indeed, because these criteria describe measurable opportunities for RECs and anchor states to work and interact with the command and other elements of the U.S. government, their measurement will help produce a more comprehensive view of the willingness of Africans to work with AFRICOM.

- **First Criterion:** Tally and track the number and type of authorities and accesses allowed by RECs and anchor states for AFRICOM activities over time.⁷² To help understand the rationale for cases of African resistance to AFRICOM, it is necessary to track this criterion while keeping a “researcher’s eye” upon AFRICOM’s organization and posture, as well as upon the historical foundations for resistance to the command and the drive for regional integration, as described in this paper.
- **Second Criterion:** Tally and track the number and type of Department of State (DOS) country policies and embargoes affecting the REC or anchor state over time.⁷³ This measure reviews whether the country is on a DOS or other U.S. government “blacklist” to determine if the political actor is opposed to U.S. strategic interests as described in the “Evolving U.S. Interests” section of this paper.

- **Third Criterion:** Tally and track the number and type of multilateral or bilateral operations RECs lead or participate in as enabled by the anchor state. This measure assesses the REC and anchor state's involvement in AU, UN, DOS or AFRICOM operations and programs, as well as the viability of the REC's ASF ready brigade. For example, ECOWAS, a "leader in peace and security among the RECs," would most likely achieve a "passing grade" with this measure.⁷⁴

More research is required to further define and assign relative weights to each criterion. However, even without further refinement, research utilizing these criteria while focusing on the most pertinent African audiences (from the perspective of AFRICOM, RECs and anchor states), will provide an actionable barometer on questions related to the willingness of Africans to accept the command's mission and presence.

Conclusion

From inception, AFRICOM has had a rough welcome among African opinion leaders. The U.S.' evolving and late-breaking deeper interest in Sub-Saharan Africa, as most recently expressed by AFRICOM's advent and especially in light of the continent's colonial and neocolonial history, is interpreted by some Africans as an effort to off-set the influence of other nations in a quest for natural resources, as well as to achieve counterterrorism objectives. Given AFRICOM's small footprint and partnering approach for fostering U.S. strategic interests, the willingness of key audiences to work with the command is a prerequisite for mission success.

Africa's history, which drives both resistance to AFRICOM and a tendency to organize into regional structures, as well as the command's small footprint approach, argue for focusing research on RECs and their associated anchor states to determine whether the most significant audiences will be receptive to the command over time. Previous research utilized a scattergun

methodology consisting of occasional interviews and mass internet searches to unearth unfavorable press and scholarly articles. This unfocused approach has not persuasively determined if AFRICOM's revamped approach yielded an increased willingness to collaborate with the command. This is because these efforts were not aimed at the most significant audiences regarding the problem of AFRICOM's receptivity—RECs and anchor states. To measure the willingness of these political actors to work with AFRICOM, researchers must account for an understanding of U.S. interests in the region, AFRICOM's partnering approach, and how Africa's history has motivated resistance to the command and a tendency for Africans to integrate in response to challenges.



Notes

1. Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, RL3400322 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2011), where the summary page references President Bush's announcement. For AFRICOM's full operational capability, see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 2009), 16.
2. Andrew Feickert, *The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress*, RL34003 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2013), 2.
3. The three CCMDs responsible for Africa were PACOM (Madagascar), EUCOM (southern and western portions of Africa), and CENTCOM (responsible for the Horn of Africa and other portions of eastern Africa), see House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *AFRICOM: Rationales, Roles, and Progress on the Eve of Operations*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 2008, S. Doc. 110–204, 2. Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for Sub-Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified Command Plan,” *Parameters* (Winter 2000-2001): U.S. Army War College online edition is not paginated, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/00winter/catoire.htm> (accessed 24 November 2013), comments on the difficulty prioritizing U.S. interests with three CCMDs sharing the region. For difficulty coordinating activities on the continent, see Ploch, 2, where the seams between the three combatant commands with responsibilities on the continent created coordination problems. For AFRICOM's initial mission statement, see U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs Office, brochure entitled “United States Africa Command, The First Three Years,” Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, March 2011.
4. Diana B. Putman, “Combating African Questions About the Legitimacy of AFRICOM,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2008), abstract and page 1.
5. Stephen Burgess, “In the National Interest? Authoritarian Decision-making and the Problematic Creation of US Africa Command,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 38, no. 1 (2009): 95.
6. U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet, “U.S. Africa Command,” Fact Sheet developed by U.S. AFRICA Command Public Affairs, July 2013, <http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Article/6107/fact-sheet-united-states-africa-command> (assessed 29 August 2013). The complete mission statement and “core mission” is as follows: U.S. Africa Command protects and defends the national security interests of the United States by *strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations* and, when directed, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development. The command's operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs support U.S. Government foreign policy and do so *primarily through military-to-military activities and assistance programs*. Our *core mission of assisting African states and regional organizations* to strengthen their defense capabilities better enables Africans

to address their security threats and reduces threats to U.S. interests. We concentrate our efforts on contributing to the development of capable and professional militaries that respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and more effectively contribute to stability in Africa. U.S. AFRICOM most effectively advances U.S. national security interests through focused, sustained engagement with partners in support of our shared security objectives” (emphasis added to show the stress on regional organizations). Of Note: As of November 18, 2013, the AFRICOM website, at <http://www.africom.mil/what-we-do>, under “What We Do,” had a different mission statement posted: “United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.” When the author of this article contacted AFRICOM Public Affairs on the discrepancy, via an email the Public Affairs POC confirmed the Fact Sheet has the most current mission statement.

7. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “African Union (AU) & Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa,” <http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/african-union-au-regional-economic-communities-recs-africa> (assessed 2 December 2013). Also African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (June 2008), <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf> (accessed 21 September 2013), 2, lists the “parties” to the agreement as, “the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC).” The latter two organizations are not RECs. For the quote, see Sipho Buthelezi, *Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects & Challenges for the 21st Century*, (East London: Ikhwezi Africa Publishing, 2006), xiv.

8. This paper is attempting to address a research question posed in the U.S. Army War College 2012-2013 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL). Containing proposed research topics garnered from military and civilian defense experts, the KSIL is published annually by the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute “for the purpose of making students and other researchers aware of strategic topics that are...of special importance to the U.S. Army.” In the 2012-2013 KSIL, the first research topic listed for Sub-Saharan Africa is “Assess the evolving role and organization of AFRICOM, and its *receptivity within Africa*” (emphasis added). The challenge, of course, is defining receptivity for the purposes of the research. The author of this paper could not find a community of practice definition of “receptivity.” There are multiple extent papers and articles written on the relative resistance or (alternatively) acceptance by Africans of AFRICOM, though most of this body of research does not reference the term receptivity. However, there is a common thread in the research regarding the approach to the problem of AFRICOM’s acceptance in Africa, as follows: Regarding AFRICOM’s posture, mission, actions, and *intent* in the past, present, and future, what *really* matters regarding receptivity are the *perceptions* Africans have of the command’s motives and effects. Putman argued

persuasively that AFRICOM must be considered “legitimate” by Africans to be successful. On page 4, Putman notes that, “international political disputes frequently invoke the concept of legitimacy.” Drawing on the work of international relations scholar Edward Luck, Putman concluded, “*An action is seen as legitimate when it is in compliance with the law, is authentic or genuine, or is seen as reasonable*” (emphasis added). Burgess, 5, while assessing the causes of AFRICOM’s birthing problems, noted the “*resistance* that would arise from African leaders, who were intended beneficiaries of the AFRICOM initiative” (emphasis added). Ploch, 3, in her Congressional Research Report on AFRICOM, asserted that among key U.S. Congressional oversight questions is, “how are AFRICOM and U.S. military efforts in Africa *perceived* by Africans and by other foreign countries” and “*have those perceptions evolved* since the command was first announced” (emphasis added). Steven W. Klingman, “AFRICOM: The Militarization of Peace,” Research Report (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2008), 14, concludes the “key to the accomplishment of AFRICOM’s mission is winning the “*hearts and minds*” of the African people [and] achieving stability and security throughout the continent is not possible if the United States’ efforts *are not fully accepted*” (emphasis added). David E. Brown, *AFRICOM at 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command*, Letort Paper, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013), Brown, whose paper, in part, attempts to answer the same 2012-2013 KSIL item inspiring this paper, comments on page 56, “so vociferous was initial African opposition to AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 that the AU issued a nonbinding resolution asking member-states not to host AFRICOM on the continent” (emphasis added). The major themes of the aforementioned research efforts are: perceptions by Africans of AFRICOM motives; perceptions among Africans of AFRICOM’s legitimacy (defined by whether the command’s presence and mission are legal and reasonable in the view of Africans); and the amount of resistance and opposition to AFRICOM for any number of reasons.

This paper attempts to define receptivity in a more concrete and measurable form to help enable the possibility of actionable results from future receptivity research. For this work, the definition of “receptivity” is simply the willingness of Africa’s most influential political actors to work with the command. This author believes the ability to actually measure receptivity as expressed in specific African perceptions and behavior is critically important for ensuring research results are “actionable” by AFRICOM. By actionable, we mean receptivity research should be measurable over time, and the measures should be quantifiable enough so AFRICOM can recalibrate engagements given U.S. interests in the region, the command’s mission and approach, the colonial and neocolonial history of Africa, and the tendency of Africans to integrate into regional political structures to address security and developmental challenges (as argued through the rest of this paper).

9. See Burgess for the sole example of comprehensive receptivity research this researcher found. Burgess’ work identified and assessed the reactions of relevant political actors within regional organizations and anchor states to the mission and presence AFRICOM. However, since Burgess’ work, and since AFRICOM revamped its posture and mission in response to receptivity issues, receptivity research has not followed the comprehensive methodology Burgess utilized.

10. Putman, 23, notes the author “reviewed 368 media articles between 3 August 2007 and 25 February 2008. About three quarters came from African media; the rest came from all over the

world.” Also, in endnote 3, Putman references two other papers (one by Valerie Reed, and one by Mills, et. al.), also utilized snapshot-in-time internet searches to obtain information on how stakeholders felt about AFRICOM. See also Brown, in Part IV (“External Perceptions of AFRICOM: Africa, Energy, China, and France”), 56–76, explores and addresses aspects related to AFRICOM’s receptivity. Brown was attempting to address the same *2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL)* research topic this paper is addressing: “Assess the evolving role and organization of AFRICOM, and its receptivity within Africa.” On page 56, he reports his “admittedly... unscientific sample” revealed “a broad range of provocative articles opposing the Command with titles such as: “AFRICOM’s Imperial Agenda Marches On,” “Beware the Rotten Fruit of AFRICOM Training,” “Resist AFRICOM—Puppet Masters,” “AFRICOM or Africon?” and “AFRICOM: Devil in the Backyard.” Brown commendably reviews and assesses efforts to help with receptivity. In addition, he summarizes possible reasons for African resistance to AFRICOM, followed by, for the most part, Brown’s attempts to rebut the objections. Therefore, in essence Part IV of Brown’s paper is an attempt to *improve* AFRICOM’s receptivity problems rather than just report on the current state of receptivity. Though on page 60 Brown notes, “[w]hile AFRICOM’s vocal opponents are becoming fewer and perhaps more fringe than mainstream... there remains strong opposition to AFRICOM among certain African audiences” (emphasis added), it is not clear from Brown’s argument whether receptivity has improved, or whether opponents are now less “mainstream” than in the past.

11. This paper uses a few of the central ideas within the international relations theory of realism to help assess the behavior of regional organizations and states and to determine the influence regional hegemons (also called “anchor states”) exert on associated regional organizations. Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998), 31-33, and table on page 38, provides a survey of international relations theories, including Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Walt asserts, persuasively, that policy makers--whether they realize it or not--view the world through lenses aligning with a theory of international relations that attempts to explain the behavior of political actors. Realism theory “depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states” and helps to explain, for example “war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation” as driven by the condition of the international system. Because of this condition, and despite the presence of other possible drivers of political behavior (for example, non-state actors, such as international institutions, and the ideas and beliefs of elites), the most influential actors on the world stage are states. There are several schools of thought within realism theory, and as this paper progresses the school of thought that best sheds light on the question at hand is stipulated, defined, and applied.

12. Theo Neethling, “Establishing AFRICOM: Pressing Questions, Political Concerns and Future Prospects,” *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies* 36, no. 1 (2008): 31, “in the post-Cold War period, Africa did not constitute a top strategic priority for the U.S. A 1995 report by the Department of Defense (DoD) listed Africa at the bottom of the world’s regions in strategic terms. In 1998, the National Security Strategy of the U.S. confirmed that America’s security interests with regard to Africa were limited. Hence the tendency in the past was to relegate Africa to the periphery of American strategy;” Ploch, 13, for the quote.

13. For the definition of grand strategy, see Colin Dueck, *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 1. For the reference to the 2000 National Security Strategy, see William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=73 (assessed November 16, 2013), 78, regarding Sub-Saharan Africa, the document noted, “[s]ustaining...recent successes [regarding growing U.S. ties with the region] will require that we *identify those issues* that most directly affect our interests” (emphasis added).

14. George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002. http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=32 (assessed 16 November 2013), 5, notes, “the United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach,” and “thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across Asia” (emphasis added). Page 16 for, “Africa’s capable reforming states and sub-regional organizations must be strengthened as the primary means to address transnational threats on a sustained basis.”

15. For reference to the 2006 NSS, see Neethling, 32; Ploch, 14, for 2010 NSS.

16. For West African oil and other natural resources, see Jean-Michael Severino and Olivier Ray, *Africa’s Moment* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011, 252. For the quote, see Theresa Whelan, *Why AFRICOM? An American Perspective*, ISS Situation Report (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, August 2007), 1.

17. For U.S. actions to secure sea lines of communications, see Ploch, 16. Foreign aid data is from Carl Tarnoff and Leonardo Lawson, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, R40213 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2011), 14-15, with the majority of foreign aid going to Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

18. Jim Garamone, “Military will Maintain Low-Key Africa Presence,” *American Forces Press Service* (March 14, 2013), 1. <http://www.africom.mil/Newsroom/Article/10475/military-will-maintain-low-key-africa-presence> (accessed 23 November 2013).

19. Ploch, 12, for DOD and AFRICOM initial plans for locating the command’s headquarters on the continent along with multiple regional hubs; Government Accountability Office, *DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-13-46 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2013), 6; and page 7 for the location of the proposed five regional hubs. Whelan, 5, for discrete command presence; and Klingman, 2, discusses the initial paucity of African leaders willing to welcome AFRICOM infrastructure and personnel.

20. Government Accountability Office, *DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of U.S. Africa Command*; this report criticizes DOD for not conducting a comprehensive analysis to support the final decision on the permanent location of the headquarters (in particular, the authors believe more consideration should have been given to relocating the headquarters to the United States). On pages 5-9, the report reviews the controversy created by the U.S.’ initial attempts to secure a location on the continent, as well as

the factors feeding into the Secretary of Defense's decision to keep the headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. PHONCON with South Africa Security Cooperation Cell POC, 12 December 2013, regarding decision to work in hybrid cells on the continent vice larger AFRICOM offices; U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet, "U.S. Africa Command," on hubs. Ploch, 10, notes General Ward (the first AFRICOM combatant commander), "found AFRICOM's dispersed presence among its Offices of Security Cooperation (OSCs) across the continent to be sufficient in terms of an on-continent presence. Finally, the regional hubs also suffered from a U.S. source of receptivity issues as well, since the Department of State was "uncomfortable" because the offices would not be "operating under the Ambassador's Chief of Mission authority," see Government Accountability Office, *DOD Needs to Reassess Options for Permanent Location of U.S. Africa Command*, 6.

21. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, <http://www.kaiptc.org> (accessed November 19, 2013), located at Accra, Ghana, the KAIPTC "undertakes and delivers research and training programs that contribute to global peacekeeping operations." U.S. Africa Command, "About the Command," <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command> (accessed November 19, 2013); and Ploch, 10.
22. Ploch, 9.
23. Brown, 18-19 for Molesworth. Garamone, 1, there are also AFRICOM personnel at MacDill AFB. Ploch, 8-9, notes the cooperative security locations are in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.
24. United States Africa Command, "Subordinate Commands," <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/subordinate-commands> (assessed November 25, 2013).
25. Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa J9 Engagement and Outreach Division, brochure, "Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa, U.S. Africa Command," Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, 2012, 3; and see United States Africa Command, "Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa," <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/subordinate-commands/cjtf-hoa> (assessed November 19, 2013).
26. United States Africa Command Public Affairs, "United States Special Operations Command Africa," <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/subordinate-commands/socaf> (accessed November 24, 2013), for information on SOCAFRICA. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 2010), 5. Ploch, 12, notes "AFRICOM's four service component commands are: U.S. Army Africa (USARAF); U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF); U.S. Marine Forces, Africa (MARFORAF); and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA). Often dual tasked to EUCOM as well, these components are located, respectively, at Vicenza, Italy; Naples, Italy; Stuttgart, Germany; Ramstein, Germany; and Stuttgart, Germany."

27. For example, AFRICOM works with and through the State Department for many of its missions, especially since the command must coordinate with the Chief of Mission in each African country for many of its activities. Katrina Coolman, Sileranda Lassa, and Yacoub Mohamed, “AFRICOM: An Effective Organization or a Military Hurdle?” Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, 2013), 3.
28. General (ret) Carter Ham, “United States Africa Command 2013 Posture Statement,” Written Testimony to Senate Armed Services Committee (March 7, 2013), 7; and see United States Africa Command, “Interagency,” <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/interagency> (accessed November 24, 2013). Of note, the latter source reports slightly different numbers of federal agencies and embedded non-DOD personnel (e.g. 10 federal agencies vice the 2013 Posture Statement’s report of nine federal agencies). However, AFRICOM Public Affairs personnel informed this author they are updating the command’s website to reflect the numbers in this paper. For AFRICOM’s civilian deputy, see United States Africa Command, “Leadership,” <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/leadership>, and “Ambassador Phillip Carter, III,” <http://www.africom.mil/about-the-command/leadership/ambassador-phillip-carter-iii> (accessed November 24, 2013).
29. Burgess, 2, “...US officials pressed on towards AFRICOM’s full operational capability. However, in response to strong African resistance to the prospect of an enhanced US military presence on the continent, the directive to place an AFRICOM headquarters somewhere in Africa was shelved in May 2008.”
30. Benedikt Franke and Stefan Ganzle, “How ‘African’ is the African Peace and Security Architecture? Conceptual and Practical Constraints of Regional Security Cooperation in Africa,” *African Security* 5, no. 2 (April-June 2012): 92; and U.S. Africa Command Fact Sheet, “U.S. Africa Command,” notes, “Our *core* mission of assisting African states and regional organizations to strengthen their defense capabilities better enables Africans to address their security threats and reduces threats to U.S. interests” (emphasis added).
31. United State Africa Command, “Overview Brief,” (April 2013) <http://www.africom.mil/staff-resources/us-africa-command-command-brief> (accessed November 24, 2013); and Garamone, 1, for the great disparity among economic classes in the population. For the failed, fragile, and weakest, states, see Tim Glawion, “Conflict, Mediation, and the African State: How Foreign Support and Democracy Lead to a Strong Political Order,” *African Security* 6, no. 1 (January-March 2013), 38; though on page 40 Glawion contends assigning measures like failed, fragile, and weakest to states in Africa (especially Sub-Saharan Africa) is problematic, since this method “implies that a state once existed and then failed,” when in fact the “state” as a political actor “was never strongly present in Africa.”
32. Putman, 5-6, is the source for the information on colonial and neocolonial historical information in this paragraph, unless otherwise noted.
33. Wafula, 8, for proxy conflicts and the UN initiatives.
34. Ibid.

35. Burgess, 80, 89 and 91, traces sources of non-receptivity.
36. Regarding countries the U.S. may have felt pressured to compete with in Africa in a competition for natural resources, examples are China, Brazil, and India. See Catherine Besteman, “Beware of those bearing gifts: An anthropologist’s view of AFRICOM,” *Anthropology Today* 24, no. 5 (October 2008): 20; Besteman captures many of these criticisms when she notes, “AFRICOM will not benefit Africans, enhance African security or prevent war. Instead, it will benefit the US military, US defense contractors, US oil companies, African governments interested in repressing indigenous, minority, activist, environmentalist and resistance groups, and terrorists, who will win new adherents to their causes amongst those targeted by US rhetoric and provoked by the presence of US troops on their soil.”
37. Keir Giles, *Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Letort Paper, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013), 1.
38. Benedikt and Ganzle, 92.
39. Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement*, GAO-13-199 (Washington D.C.: Government Accountability Office, February 2013), 3, for four out of the world’s ten quickest growing economies. Severino and Ray, 151, for “a third of the planet’s mineral reserves” (Africa ranked second behind the Middle East in oil reserves). Scott Firsing and Ogi Williams, “Increased Chinese and American Defense Involvement in Africa,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 29, no. 2 (2013): 89, for increasing Chinese trade and influence.
40. Government Accountability Office, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement*, 21.
41. Burgess, 92-96, traces the mostly “mixed” or “negative” responses to AFRICOM of some of the most prominent RECs and associated states (including anchor states). Putman, 2, also describes the non-receptivity to AFRICOM of multiple RECs. Brown, 58, notes, “AFRICOM was particularly strongly opposed, at least initially, by countries such as South Africa and Nigeria, which saw it as a threat to their status as regional hegemons.”
42. S.K.B. Asante, *Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 29.
43. Coolman, Lassa, and Mohamed, and see footnote 137, for the concept of regionalism.
44. Ssebunya E. Kasule, “Self-Interest in African Regional Economic Organizations and Lessons from the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” *Air and Space Power Journal, Africa and Francophone* 3, no. 4 (4th Quarter 2012): 48-50, for information in this paragraph, unless otherwise specified.
45. Diane E. Chido, *From Chaos to Cohesion: A Regional Approach to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Letort Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013), 20, terms these boundaries “artificial” since they did not reflect precolonial era tribal boundaries.

46. Kasule, 47 and 50; Asante, 29, for “balkanization.”

47. Asante, 29, for the quote; also see 30-31, and 36.

48. Mzukisi Qobo, *The Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa in the Context of Globalization and the Prospects for a United States of Africa*, ISS Paper 145 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, June 2007), 3.

49. Buthelezi, xvii; and see Asante, 30, “given this background, it is not surprising economic integration has been seen as a means of helping to overcome the disadvantages of small size, low per capita incomes, small populations, and narrow resource bases...it has also been seen as a means of consolidating the political independence of African countries...in brief, therefore, economic integration in general is not only desirable, it is necessary if Africa is to industrialize.”

50. African Union, African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact (Abuja, Nigeria: 31 January 2005), 1; this pact notes the signatories are “conscious of the gravity of the impact of conflicts both within and among African States, on peace, security stability in the Continent, and their devastating impact on socio-economic development” (emphasis added), http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_NON_ AGGRESSION_AND_COMMON_DEFENCE_PACT.pdf (accessed 3 August 2013).

51. Robert G. Berschinski, *AFRICOM’s Dilemma: the Global War on Terrorism, Capacity Building, Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa*, SSI Report (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 23.

52. Chido, 20, for African cross-border conflicts. James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Statement for the Record provided to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 April 2013, 21, “since 2008, Uganda has deployed troops across Congo, South Sudan, and Central African Republic to pursue Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), with US assistance, including approximately 100 US military advisors.” Berschinski, 23, “the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a militant Christian group based in northern Uganda and southern Sudan [now the nation of South Sudan], has waged a 20-year insurgency leaving over two million Ugandans homeless and displaced.”

53. Walt, for a survey of international relations theories; and 31, for Stephen Waltz’s “structural” explanation of anarchic and self-help international environment driving state behavior. Michael J. Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1996), provides a more detailed review and assessment of international relations theories, with Waltz’s structural school of realism on page 78.

54. Soren Scholvin, “From Rejection to Acceptance: The Conditions of Regional Contestation and Fellowship to Post-Apartheid South Africa,” *African Security* 6, no. 2 (April-June 2013): 134-135; Scholvin, citing Waltz and referring to a possible motive for how states in the Southern

African Development Community (SADC) REC relate to South Africa as a regional hegemon, terms these states “defensive positionalists.” On page 138, Scholvin asserts states must “decide between balancing and bandwagoning—that is...decide whether to contest or to follow.” In the realist-based argument this paper uses to help explain the tendency for African states to form regional blocks, the “balancing” is against *external* powers, while the “bandwagoning” takes place *within* each REC.

55. Putman, 7, for OAU and Cold War proxy conflicts. In addition, Qobo, 2, finds African leaders were motivated to cooperate by a desire to spur “political and economic progress,” as well as the need to balance against non-African influences.

56. Buthelezi, xiv. The five regions were from around and inside the compass—northern, eastern, southern, western, and central.

57. Kristiana Powell, “The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivery on the Responsibility to Protect,” Working Paper (Ontario, Canada: The North South Institute, May 2005), 15.

58. Williams, 3, for formation of the AU. African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Durban, South Africa: 9 December 2002), 23-24, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf (accessed 5 August 2013), 2, for security responsibilities.

59. African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 23-24; non-African donors were expected, for the foreseeable future, to contribute to the brigades’ equipage, training, mobility, and sustainment requirements. For ASF brigade delays, see Leela Jacinto, “Can the Dream of an African Security Force Come True,” *France 24 International News*, 12 Oct 2013, <http://www.france24.com/en/20131208-african-standby-force-security-dream-france-military> (accessed 2 December 2013), 2-3. For codification of the AU and REC mobilization and coordination process, see African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, 7.

60. Franke and Ganzle, 93, among the reasons a REC may operate independently of the AU’s coordinating mechanisms is the preference by some states to avoid ceding military capability to a continent-wide defense structure. As Powell, 52 (in footnote xliv) notes, ECOWAS considers the UN--*not the AU*--the authority “on matters pertaining to peace and security.” Jacinto, 2, also notes the aversion some African states have to “relinquish[ing] their national command authorities to a continental command structure.”

61. Burgess, 3, see footnote 7.

62. Chido, 40.

63. Schlovin, 147; Schlovin was only referring to South Africa (since his article concerned the relationship of regional states to South Africa's power and position) when he formulated this definition; however, this definition applies equally well to other African sub-regional hegemons for the purposes of this paper.

64. Walt, 18 and 30.

65. Asante, 46, for the quote. On pages 45-73, the author outlines what he views as the dismal failures of RECs in their bid to increase Africa's economic prospects in the decades leading up to 1997 (when his book was published). Asante certainly was not advocating a realist explanation for the problems. However, the quote led this researcher to believe Asante captured the central problem with RECs as political actors: States, doing what states do, look after their own interests first. This is aptly expressed in Asante's lament on page 73, "the lack of commitment to regionalism has manifested itself in member countries independently developing their own strategies, plans and priorities."

66. Notwithstanding the material and other assistance provided by non-African donors to Africa's integration efforts; for this see Michael Kluth, "The European Union and Sub-Saharan Africa—From Intervention Towards Deterrence?" *African Security Review*, 22, no. 1 (March 2013): 25, where Kluth notes the funding contributions of the European Community to multiple AU and REC initiatives, to include the standby brigades. Franke and Ganzle, 97-98, outline the EU and U.S. funding, material, and training assistance to Africa's capacity-building efforts, to include regional integration efforts.

67. Burgess, 13 and 19.

68. However, the UN did authorize the ECOWAS incursion into Mali through a resolution, and France, the U.S., and others provided direct and indirect assistance. Chido, 24-26, reviews the ECOWAS response to the 2012-2013 Mali crisis.

69. Powell, 16.

70. "Nigeria Says to Begin Troop Pullout on Wednesday," *Reuters*, 30 July 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/30/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBRE96T1EJ20130730> (accessed 13 December 2013).

71. Coolman, Lassa, and Mohamed, 57, for the lack of a hegemon for ECCAS; and "Q&A: Central African Republic's Rebellion" *BBC News Africa*, 11 January 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20798007>, (accessed 2 December 2013), summarizes the history of instability and conflict in the region, to include the rebels seizing power in 2013; also, "Chad Hosts Summit on Central African Crisis," *Agent-France Presse*, 4 April 2013, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130418/chad-hosts-summit-central-african-republic--crisis> (accessed 4 December 2013); in April 2013, when ECCAS member nations held a summit in Chad to discuss the problems in CAR, some felt the ECCAS forces were "insufficient to do the job." Some observers were skeptical of a helpful summit outcome, since ECCAS member nations lack requisite "trained manpower and resources to maintain peacekeeping forces," and

the “region was fed up with always having to help the same country.” French and South African forces have deployed to CAR to conduct peacekeeping operations, and the British have provided equipment and mobility support, see UPI Top News, “Britons send more military equipment to CAR,” http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special /2013/12/12/Britons-send-more-military-equipment-to-CAR/UPI-74721386862728/?utm_source =Africa+Center+for+Strategic+b+Studies+-+Media+Review+for+December+13%2C+013&utm_campaign= 12%2F13%2F2013 &utm_medium=email (accessed 13 December 2013). At the summit, President Delby of Chad asserted the 500-man “international ECCAS military force” was insufficient for the mission.

72. PHONCON with a point of contact from the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs, 2 December 2013, for this criterion. This individual suggested the best methodology for quantitatively assessing receptivity over time was to track accesses and authorities (e.g., for exercises, military-to-military engagements for capacity building, or other types of security cooperation or security force assistance engagements) granted overtime by RECs and anchor states to AFRICOM.

73. PHONCON with a point of contact from the Pretoria, South Africa, Defense Attaché Office, Security Cooperation cell, 12 December 2013, for this criterion. And see the U.S. Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, “Country Policies and Embargoes,” http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/ (accessed 2 December 2013), for the most current list of black listed countries.

74. Cara Marie Wagner, “Reconsidering Peace in the Horn of Africa: The Impact of Increased Cooperation and the African Peace and Security Architecture,” *African Security Review* 22, no. 2 (June 2013), 44, Wagner asserts ECOWAS’ role as a conflict manager displaying a commitment to democratic principles can be used a comparative measure for other RECs. The assumption here is RECs with the characteristics and behaviors of ECOWAS would be receptive to AFRICOM’s presence and mission (as evidenced by the presence of an AFRICOM liaison officer at ECOWAS headquarters).

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